

U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia

June 10, 1981



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Following is an address by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 10, 1981.

You have asked me to meet with you twice for a review of U.S. policy toward Europe. I welcome the opportunity to put the policy of this Administration on the record. Last week I focused on our relations with Western Europe [see Current Policy 283, June 2, 1981]. I stressed our interest in the military security and economic well-being of the transatlantic community and our clear commitment to good bilateral ties throughout the region.

Today I will concentrate on our relations with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the nations of Eastern Europe. I will emphasize our concern with the challenge from adversaries and our commitment to building constructive ties over time that promote lasting peace.

This week, as last, I speak against the backdrop of the Reagan Administration's overall foreign policy. It is a policy with four points that bear on our relations not only with Western Europe but also with those nations I address today:

- Our insistence on restraint and reciprocity in East-West relations;
- Our determination to strengthen our alliances, particularly NATO;
- Our intention to play a constructive role in the developing nations of the world; and
- Our resolve to strengthen our economy and our defenses.

A fundamental point of departure for this presentation is the distinction between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and, indeed, among the countries of Eastern Europe themselves. Nothing could serve our interests in that part of the world worse than to lump them into one bloc. Each nation presents unique problems and unique opportunities for the United States.

The U.S.-Soviet relationship remains the most important element of U.S. foreign policy. As it has since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union represents the primary threat to U.S. security and interests. Our efforts to deal with that threat have the most profound implications for our national defense posture, our budget, and the rest of American diplomacy. Failure to deal adequately with the challenges presented us by the Soviet Union would have the most serious of consequences, for the United States and for the rest of the world.

Yugoslavia and each of the nations of Eastern Europe have their own distinctive character and dynamics. In our relations with the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe, we seek to encourage evolutionary change toward greater diversity and national independence. We do so because of the conviction that this approach will serve best our interest in stability and peace in Europe. Yugoslavia—a unique, non-aligned nation—is of special importance to the United States. Our relations with that nonaligned country are qualitatively different from those of the Warsaw Pact

countries of Eastern Europe. We have not had relations with Albania since World War II.

Bearing these distinctions in mind, let me turn to:

- Relations with the Soviet Union: status of that relationship, the new approach of the Reagan Administration, progress to date, and prospects for the future; and
- Relations with Yugoslavia and the nations of Eastern Europe: our general interests and instruments of policy and ties with the individual countries.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Status of the Relationship

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have rarely been more troubled than at the present. The roots of current bilateral tensions are buried in fundamentally different systems and world views. But, in recent years, a number of factors have sharpened dramatically the differences between our two countries. The most significant of these factors has been a growing lack of restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. This tendency has manifested itself in a variety of ways.

First, there has been an unprecedented Soviet military buildup. Soviet military expenditures have grown steadily over the past 20 years at an average of 4%-5% a year. As a result, a conservative estimate of our spending and theirs shows that the Soviets outspent us by 30% in 1979 alone. The Soviet effort has allowed the U.S.S.R. to pull abreast of us in strategic and naval forces and in other areas of traditional U.S. predominance, while improving in both quantitative and qualitative terms its margin of superiority around its borders. It has also given the Soviet Union unprecedented capabilities for the projection of power.

Second, the Soviets have shown a growing propensity to use force as an instrument of policy. Directly, as in Afghanistan, or acting through proxies, as in Angola and Ethiopia, the Soviets have shown a growing preference for military solutions to regional issues. At the same time, their support of so-called

movements of national liberation and organizations engaging in international terrorism has continued unabated, despite its impact on relations with the West.

Even in Europe—an area the Soviets have tried to make an “island of detente” in order to further Soviet economic and political goals and to insure access to Western credits and technology—the Soviet Union has resorted to the most blatant tactics of intimidation to influence events in Poland. While the military situation in and around that country is not as alarming as earlier this year, heavy Soviet political pressure continues and Soviet military intervention could still come with little warning.

The Soviet Union's increasingly assertive behavior stems only partly from its enhanced military capabilities. It can also be attributed to the lack of credible constraints on the part of the United States and other nations. For whatever reasons—and they are many and complex—the Soviet leadership in recent years has shown little regard for the ability and/or the will of the West to respond effectively to its challenges. And, when the West has responded, it has too often been without coherence or real credibility.

A New Relationship

The Reagan Administration has moved forcefully in its first 4 months in office to reverse these trends. We seek a relationship with the Soviet Union which better serves U.S. interests—a relationship grounded in realities, not hopes. Such a relationship must be based on two principles: restraint and reciprocity.

Restraint. We cannot expect the Soviet Union to renounce the use of force and violence as instruments of foreign policy if such means continue to pay benefits. Bringing about greater Soviet restraint will involve demonstrating that there is no attractive alternative. This approach will require, first of all, that the United States improve its capabilities in areas where our interests and the Soviets come into conflict. Our focus will be threefold.

- First, we will improve the defense balance to insure our security, avoid the prospect of political blackmail, and reestablish allied confidence.

- Second, we will repair our alliances. As I noted in my earlier presentation, this approach will require much closer and more effective consultations than we have conducted in the past. Our perceptions and interests will never coincide perfectly with those of our allies, but it is important that we share a general sense of strategy and tactics in our approach to East-West problems.

- Finally, we will expand our capabilities for meeting Soviet challenges to our interests in the developing world. Doing so will require that we take better advantage than in the past of our political, economic, and other assets—and those of our allies. And, it will demand a greater investment of scarce economic and other resources. It will also take a greater effort in the realm of security—both directly and by strengthening the capabilities of our friends in areas threatened by Soviet expansionism. Our efforts in each of these fields will require great sensitivity to local conditions to insure that we do not create more problems for ourselves than we resolve.

Reciprocity. Demonstrating to the Soviets, by expanding our own capabilities, that there is no alternative to restraint is a *sine qua non* to the success of our approach. But, we recognize as well the value and long-term necessity of giving the Soviets incentives to act with greater restraint.

The Reagan Administration does not view cooperation with the Soviet Union as an end in itself. Nor does it believe that the prospect of cooperative activities will necessarily induce the Soviet Union to moderate its policies. Linkage will be an operative principle. The leaders of the Soviet Union cannot expect to enjoy the benefits of joint activities in areas of interest to them, even as they seek to undercut our interests.

But, in the context of adequate and credible U.S. defense and regional capabilities and on a basis of strict reciprocity of benefits, the United States is open to an expansion of mutually beneficial activities, if justified by Soviet behavior. The United States is prepared to respond positively to constructive initiatives by the Soviet Union. However, given the lessons of recent history, it is clear that we cannot be satisfied with words alone. Soviet actions in Afghan-

istan and elsewhere have created the existing obstacles to expanded relations. Soviet actions will be required to remove them.

The areas where our insistence on reciprocity will have its most direct applications are arms control and economic policy. With respect to arms control, the Administration's review remains underway. The issues are complex and related to basic decisions on U.S. military programs which will be made only in the months ahead. We have nonetheless made clear our recognition of the potential value of verifiable, balanced arms control agreements which enhance our national security. The President has expressed his commitment to the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] process. It is also our intention to begin negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on theater nuclear forces (TNF) arms control by the end of the year. We are continuing to participate, along with our NATO allies, in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna.

With regard to economic policy, the challenge for us is to develop an approach which minimizes the West's vulnerability to Soviet pressure, denies the Soviets technology and goods which would enhance their military capabilities, maximizes our own leverage, and is fair to U.S. producers. We will be working with our allies and economic partners in the months ahead toward this end. In both these areas, Soviet international conduct will have a major impact on the possibilities for real progress.

Progress on New Approach

These are the broad outlines of the approach the Reagan Administration will take in its dealings with the U.S.S.R. I would like to describe briefly the progress we have made in implementing our policy.

With respect to improving our ability to restrain Soviet actions, we have moved dramatically in a range of areas to restore U.S. credibility and the capabilities which underlie it. In the defense sphere, our budgetary decisions have made clear to the Soviets and others the impossibility of their attaining superiority over the United States in any critical measurement of capabilities. At the same time, our decisions have given our allies and others an example to follow, and us, a sound position from which to urge greater allied efforts.

- With the ministerial of the North Atlantic Council, held in Rome in May, we have made a solid start at building a new NATO consensus on East-West relations based on a shared recognition of the need to restrain Soviet power.

- The meeting of the Defense Planning Group in May resulted in solid NATO reendorsement of a greater defense effort and in moving ahead on schedule with TNF modernization in Europe.

- Prime Minister Suzuki undertook in May to increase Japanese efforts in behalf of their own defense and to enhance support for U.S. forces in Japan in the interests of Far Eastern security.

Elsewhere, we are handling a variety of regional issues in ways designed to foster the climate of peaceful international change in which U.S. and Western advantages can best be brought to bear in our competition with the Soviet Union.

- We are working more effectively with the Government of Pakistan than at any time in the recent past to strengthen that strategically important nation in the face of Soviet aggression across its border into Afghanistan.

- At the same time, we continue to work closely with Pakistan and other nations to keep pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan and allow a political settlement there in keeping with the desires of the Afghan people.

- We are working with a variety of concerned governments in the region of the Persian Gulf to bolster security there in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the opportunities for further Soviet expansion presented by continuing instability in Iran and the Iran-Iraq conflict.

- We are engaged actively in efforts to resolve the current Israeli-Syrian impasse in a manner which prevents further expansion of Soviet influence in that critical and unstable region.

- In El Salvador, we have signaled our determination not to allow Soviet-backed subversion to topple a legal government seeking to implement badly needed internal reforms. We have made clear our determination to go to the source to prevent such subversion, if necessary.

- We are working with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states to build pressure on Vietnam to end its Soviet-backed occupation of Kampuchea.

- We are proceeding in a responsible manner in building an expanded relationship with the People's Republic of China.

- We are working with all interested parties to resolve such African issues as a peaceful settlement of problems in Namibia in ways which deny the Soviet Union further opportunities to expand its influence through violent means.

Prospects for the Future

These activities have conveyed to the Soviets an unmistakable signal of our seriousness and have significantly expanded our ability to influence their behavior. We must build on these efforts in the months ahead. At the same time, we have left open channels of communication with the Soviet Union. Our dialogue with the Soviet Union continues at all levels here and in Moscow. And we will build on that dialogue during the meeting in New York with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko this September.

We have made clear to the Soviets our preparedness for an improved relationship if Soviet behavior warrants it. The President's decision to lift the partial grains embargo in fulfillment of his campaign pledge could not have been taken had the Soviet Union intervened militarily in Poland. Our decision to enter into preliminary discussions with the Soviet Union on setting a date for resumption of TNF discussions should be seen in the same context. It should be clear that any Soviet move against Poland would have significant consequences for all aspects of East-West relations.

By the same token, further concrete evidence of Soviet willingness to accept peaceful change would allow a broader expansion of the relationship. Movement toward a settlement of the Afghanistan issue on terms which would insure the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces would be particularly important.

In the absence of this or similar initiatives, the United States and its allies have no alternative but to insure that we

are in a position to deal more firmly and credibly than in the past with Soviet lack of restraint. We will direct our efforts over the months ahead toward that end.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE

Eastern Europe is not a monolith. Each country in the area has its unique history and culture, and the trends in the region are toward increasing economic, social, and even political diversity. U.S. policy toward the Warsaw Pact member states of Eastern Europe—Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic—is tailored to our interests and to the situation prevailing in each country. We differentiate between these countries and the U.S.S.R. to the degree that they pursue independent foreign policies and/or more liberal domestic policies.

U.S. Interests

Our primary interests are:

- A strong and legitimate security interest based on the proposition that a peaceful Eastern Europe, which is engaged in constructive interaction with the rest of Europe and the world, can be a force for stability in Europe.
- A deep, humanitarian interest in the welfare of the peoples of Eastern Europe, both because of their internationally recognized rights and because millions of Americans trace their heritage to the area.
- A growing interest in trade and other forms of economic cooperation.

Our bilateral relations with most of the Warsaw Pact member states of Eastern Europe have improved significantly in recent years. This Administration is prepared to work toward further improvements. In doing so, it will be guided by the following considerations:

- The degree to which individual Eastern European governments demonstrate both the desire and ability to reciprocate our interests in improved relations, and demonstrate sensitivity to U.S. interests;
- Indications that these governments are willing to play a constructive

role in Europe, both through the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process and in their bilateral relations with other European countries; and

- Indications that the Eastern European governments are sensitive to the traditions and aspirations of their peoples and seek to fulfill their commitments under the provisions of basket 3, as well as other sections of the Helsinki Final Act.

Policy Instruments

Our instruments to further U.S. interests and improve relations with the countries of Eastern Europe include high-level visits, cultural and scientific exchanges, and trade and other forms of economic cooperation. We will welcome high-level contacts with leaders of those Eastern European countries with which our relations are positive and are susceptible to significant improvement. We will encourage cultural and scientific exchanges with Eastern Europe in the belief that they enhance mutual understanding and enable Eastern Europeans to experience the diversity of the United States and the vitality of its democratic institutions.

Bilateral trade has become an important component of our relations with Eastern Europe. Trade relations based on most favored nation (MFN) status now exist with Poland, Romania, and Hungary. In 1980, our total trade with Eastern Europe was \$3.3 billion, and U.S. exports exceeded imports by well over \$1 billion. In our trade and economic policy toward Eastern Europe, we seek to strike a prudent balance among our political, trade, and security interests. We seek, together with our allies, to offer Eastern Europe alternatives to even heavier reliance on trade with other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. We also want the American farmer and worker to share in the benefits of expanded export markets. At the same time, we do not intend to export technology which could adversely affect U.S. security interests.

The extension of MFN tariff treatment to Romania and Hungary has served our commercial interests and removed an obstacle to improved relations in other areas. It has also permitted substantial progress on emigration

and humanitarian issues. The President's recommendation concerning continuation of his waiver authority on MFN status for Hungary and Romania, under Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974, is subject to congressional review this month. We strongly support the continuation of the waiver for both countries. This recommendation does not ignore the fact that problems in emigration continue and that U.S. humanitarian concerns have not been entirely eliminated. But, it does take account of the progress that has been made and the likelihood of more positive results if the waiver is renewed.

Relations With Warsaw Pact Countries

In view of the diversity of Eastern Europe and our policy of differentiating among the individual countries, it is not surprising that our bilateral relations vary substantially from country to country.

Poland. The dramatic developments in Poland over the past 11 months have captured the attention of the world. We welcome changes which correspond to the aspirations and traditions of the Polish people. But, we will continue to refrain from words or actions which would complicate the resolution of Poland's problems by the Poles themselves. We continue to believe that the resolution of Poland's internal problems can be achieved best in an atmosphere of calm and moderation, free from all outside interference. We remain committed to the NATO communique of December 12, 1980, which stated that any intervention in Poland would fundamentally alter the entire international situation and that the allies would be compelled to react in a manner which the gravity of this development would require.

We have noted with concern the economic hardships faced by the Polish people and the detrimental effect of Poland's economic difficulties on efforts to continue the process of peaceful renewal. Together with other Western countries, we have taken steps to ease Poland's economic difficulties.

- Poland received the largest allocation to any country of Commodity Credit Corporation agricultural guarantees in fiscal year 1981—\$670 million.

- In April, as Poland's food supplies continued to deteriorate, we authorized the sale of \$71 million of surplus dairy products (30,000 tons of dried milk and 30,000 tons of butter) and permitted payment in Polish currency.

- We joined other Western countries in easing Poland's financial position by rescheduling repayments of official debt for the remainder of 1981. Approximately \$400 million in principal and interest owed to the U.S. Government will be affected. Together with other creditor governments, we will consider the possibility of rescheduling repayments for subsequent years.

In taking these steps, we have emphasized to the Polish authorities that we expect the Polish Government and people to make meaningful efforts to reinvigorate the Polish economy and to restore Poland's creditworthiness. We have also stressed the need for comparable steps by Poland's Warsaw Pact allies, particularly the Soviet Union. We will continue to underscore these points in future discussions on Poland's economic and financial problems.

Romania. Romania continues to pursue an independent foreign policy, as exemplified by its positions on Afghanistan and the Middle East and its constructive role in the CSCE context. Romania carries out more than 50% of its trade with non-Communist countries. The United States has become Romania's third largest trading partner.

This Administration has already begun a high-level political dialogue with Romania. Last month President Reagan and Secretary Haig met with Foreign Minister Andrei in Washington, and Commerce Secretary Baldrige traveled to Bucharest for the U.S.-Romanian Joint Economic Commission and met there with President Ceausescu. Secretary Haig underlined to Minister Andrei our recognition of Romania's unique position in Eastern Europe and support for the principle of self-determination. He also emphasized that Romanian responsiveness to U.S. concerns relating to emigration and humanitarian issues would contribute to the further development of our relations.

Hungary. Hungary has embraced the CSCE process, using it as a framework for relations with Western Europe and the United States. We are continuing to build upon the momentum

generated by the return of the Crown of St. Stephen and the signing of the U.S.-Hungarian Trade Agreement in 1978. Hungary is particularly interested in improving economic relations with the United States, and our trade relations are developing in a positive and businesslike fashion. Hungary's record on emigration continues to be positive, and its leaders permit a relatively broad degree of expression on other than political topics.

Bulgaria. We have made measured progress in improving relations with Bulgaria over the past several years, although this progress has slowed somewhat in the past year. We have a modest but active educational, scientific, and cultural exchange program with Bulgaria, and the maritime agreement we concluded at the beginning of this Administration is working out satisfactorily. U.S. trade with Bulgaria, while not extensive, is balanced in our favor, and the Bulgarian Government is interested in expanding exports to the United States and developing economic relations in other ways.

Czechoslovakia. Our relations with Czechoslovakia have been poor for some time due to the Czechoslovak Government's harsh repression of dissent and its close adherence to Soviet positions on foreign policy. Negotiations are presently underway on a settlement of postwar nationalization claims of U.S. citizens against Czechoslovakia. Some progress has been made toward an agreement, but it is far from certain that an acceptable settlement will be reached. We are consulting closely with the Congress on the progress of the negotiations.

German Democratic Republic. Despite deep differences between the United States and the G.D.R., we have sought and achieved practical improvements in our bilateral relations. Since the signing of the consular convention in 1979, we have begun negotiations on a cultural agreement, and may soon begin negotiating on claims. We have encouraged the G.D.R. to exercise restraint in Poland and in the developing world, to settle the claims of our citizens as well as Jewish claims, and to improve its implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. For its part, the G.D.R. has expedited the resolution of cases of divided families with the United States. The

G.D.R. seeks MFN treatment with us, but we have made clear that it must first settle claims and give assurances required by the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA

The position of nonaligned Yugoslavia is intrinsically different from that of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, and we deal with Yugoslavia on the basis of its unique status. Yugoslavia's collective leadership has made it clear that it will continue to pursue the course set by President Tito: nonalignment in foreign policy and self-management at home.

An independent, economically viable Yugoslavia capable of resisting external pressure is a factor for stability and peace in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and Europe as a whole. We firmly support Yugoslavia's independence, political unity, and territorial integrity. U.S.-Yugoslav relations are excellent. In recent years, we have created an extensive range of relations.

- We have maintained a mature and frank political dialogue and this Administration has furthered the dialogue.

- The United States has become Yugoslavia's fourth largest trading partner, and we are the leading foreign investor in Yugoslavia.

- Various agreements on culture, science, and technology provide the framework for a vigorous program of exchanges and joint projects.

- We are engaged with the Yugoslav military authorities in a modest program of visits, arms transfers, and training.

Despite this significant record of good relations, problems remain. Although we have made considerable progress in combating terrorist activity against Yugoslav officials and establishments in the United States, both we and the Yugoslavs are concerned over the continued existence of such activity in the United States. We are determined to deter such activity and to punish terrorists to the full extent of the law. We are pleased that 5 anti-Yugoslav terrorists were convicted recently by a court in New York City and that at present some 17 convicted terrorists are behind bars.

ALBANIA

We have not had diplomatic relations with Albania since World War II. Since the termination of its special relationship with the People's Republic of China in the summer of 1978, Albania has followed a course independent of major outside powers. Albania has moved to improve relations with Greece and Western Europe. The process of improving Albanian-Yugoslav relations had advanced significantly before the outbreak of violent demonstrations by ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia's autonomous Province of Kosovo in April and May. Albania's leaders have made it clear that they do not presently seek to improve relations with the United States. Should Albania display an interest in resuming relations with us, we would be prepared to respond.

BALTIC STATES

Some reference to U.S. policy toward the three Baltic States—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—is in order. Our policy of not recognizing their forcible incorporation into the U.S.S.R. remains unchanged. We continue to recognize and deal with diplomatic representatives of the last three Baltic governments.



CONCLUSION

This assessment of U.S. relations with Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe brings me full circle. I conclude, as I began, with reference to the overriding principles that govern foreign policy under the Reagan Administration.

- Ours is a policy that reflects respect for the territorial integrity of nations and the dignity of individuals.

- Ours is a policy that demonstrates determination to be firm in the face of aggression but forthcoming when there is constructive response to the shared challenges of the 1980s. ■

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